\u3cem\u3eVaughn v. Chadbourne\u3c/em\u3e: Strict Liability and the Road that Faded Away by Rolnick, Alan H.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
11-1-1985
Vaughn v. Chadbourne: Strict Liability and the Road
that Faded Away
Alan H. Rolnick
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan H. Rolnick, Vaughn v. Chadbourne: Strict Liability and the Road that Faded Away, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 359 (1985)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol40/iss1/18
Vaughn v. Chadbourne: Strict Liability and
the Road that Faded Away
1. INTRODUCTION ...................... .............. ................... 359
I . P ERSPECTIVE .................................................... ....... 361
A . Strict Product Liability ........................................... 361
B. Defective Improvements and Product Liability ........................ 365
C. Defective Improvements in Florida .................................. 371
IIl. ANALYSIS ............................................................... 377
A. The Paver Is a Manufacturer, the Paving Mix I a Product ........... 377
B. The Stream of Commerce .......................................... 380
C . C ausation ......................................................... 381
D . The Slavin D octrine ................................................ 384
E. W hat Is Slavin Doing Here? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  385
F. Slavin Is Misapplied to a Product Liability Action ................... 386
G . Slavin M ust G o .................................................... 389
H. Policy Reasons and Results ....................................... 390
IV . C ON CLUSION ............................................................ 392
I. INTRODUCTION
Mary Emma Vaughn and her husband, Algie, left Pensacola,
Florida, bound by car for Opp, Alabama, on the night of January
12, 1981.1 As Mrs. Vaughn drove northbound on Walton County
Road 1087 and approached a curve at a lawful rate of speed, the
left wheels of the car went over a two-inch drop-off in the center of
the two lane road. Mrs. Vaughn lost contol of the car, which twice
skidded across the road before rolling over. Mary Vaughn died and
her husband suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident.2
Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., is a paving contractor and man-
ufacturer of the materials with which it paves roads and parking
lots. In October and November of 1978, under a contract with the
Florida Department of Transportation (DOT), Chadbourne paved
Walton County Road 1087, using a paving mix of sand and asphalt
it prepared in its plant. The DOT tested the sand-asphalt mix at
Chadbourne's plant and at the work site.8 Six months after Chad-
bourne paved the stretch of road on which the Vaughns later
crashed, the State of Florida accepted the project and turned it
1. Appellant's Initial Brief at 1, Vaughn v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 462 So. 2d 512
(Fla. Ist DCA 1985), review granted, No. 66,413 (Fla. May 17, 1985) (argued Oct. 11, 1985).
2. 462 So. 2d at 513.
3. Id.
4. In the week of October 5, 1978, Chadbourne paved what later would become the
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over to Walton County for maintenance.' Chadbourne did no fur-
ther work on the road and had no further responsibility for its
upkeep.
Late in 1980, a Walton County Commissioner on official busi-
ness inspected county road 1087 and observed that the pavement
on the southbound lane was wearing away at the curve in question.
The commissioner notified the county engineering consultant, but
the county took no action to correct the erosion problem before the
accident.'
Algie Vaughn brought an action against Chadbourne for his
injuries and the wrongful death of his wife. He asserted negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and strict liability theories based on
an alleged defect in Chadbourne's paving mix.8 Chadbourne moved
for summary judgment, which the court granted on all three
counts.' Vaughn appealed. The First District Court of Appeal re-
versed and remanded. Chief Judge Ervin, writing for a unanimous
panel, held that, first, because Chadbourne is a manufacturer of
building supplies, it is a seller within the meaning of Florida's
strict liability doctrine as expressed in Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts,10 and is thus subject to strict liability
for injury-causing defects in its products; second, as a manufac-
turer of its own paving mix and not merely a contractor who pur-
chased the mix from another, Chadbourne is not absolved of liabil-
dangerous curve. Answer Brief of Appellee at 1, Vaughn v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.,
462 So. 2d 512 (Fla. lst DCA 1985).
5. The DOT tested the pavement with a rolling straightedge before accepting the road.
Inspectors found it satisfactorily level Core samples taken after the accident were within
DOT tolerances. d. at 1-2.
6. 462 So. 2d at 513.
7. Id.
8 Id. at 514.
9. Id. at 513-14.
10. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) or TORTS § 402A (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND)) (adopted by Florida in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976)).
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ity by the proximate cause fiction of the accepted-work doctrine as
expressed in Slavin v. Kay," although the drop-off in the pave-
ment indisputably had become patent and observable before the
accident. " Vaughn v. Chadbourne, 462 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985), review granted, Sup. Ct. Case No. 66,413 (Fla. May 17,
1985) (argued Oct. 11, 1985).
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. Strict Product Liability
In 1976, in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,'8 the Supreme
Court of Florida adopted a strict liability cause of action, based
upon Section 402A of the Restatement (Second), for one whose in-
jury to person or property is proximately caused by a defective
product." The case arose when a road grader backed into and over
a pedestrian who was looking into her purse as she crossed the
street to catch a bus. Her husband sued the manufacturer of the
road grader for negligent design, specifically, the lack of an audible
warning signal when the vehicle backed up, inadequate rear view
mirrors, and a blind spot if the driver tried to look behind when
backing up. A second count alleged a breach of implied warranty
or strict liability based upon the alleged design defects."8 Upon cer-
tification of questions from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, the court held, inter alia,' that:
In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the theory of
strict liability in tort, the user must establish the manufacturer's
relationship to the product in question, the defect and unreason-
ably dangerous condition of the product, and the existence of
the proximate causal connection between such condition and the
user's injuries or damages."
The West opinion acknowledged that Florida courts had de-
veloped various theories of recovery for personal injury or property
11. 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958).
12. Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 514-15.
13. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
14. Id. at 87. See supra note 10.
15. 336 So. 2d at 82.
16. The West court also held that an injured party's failure to discover the defect
would not be contributory negligence, but that unreasonable use of the product after discov-
ering the danger or lack of ordinary care could be defenses to a breach of warranty or strict
liability action. The strict liability right of action is not limited to ultimate users and ex-
tends to foreseeable bystanders within the zone of danger. Id. at 90-92.
17. Id. at 87.
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damage caused by defective products, including negligence, breach
of express and implied warranties, and fraud."8 It asserted that
these theories were now refined and consolidated to the point
where distinctions among them had taken on more theoretical than
practical significance."' The courts had expanded actions for negli-
gence and breach of implied warranty beyond contractual bounda-
ries to allow recovery by one not in privity with the seller for in-
jury caused by defective food products"0 or products recognized as
inherently dangerous." Courts had relaxed the privity requirement
not only because of the nature of products in question, but also
because of the foreseeability of their use by injured parties.",
In adopting Section 402A, the West court stated that its deci-
sion would, in most cases, mark a change in nomenclature and not
a radical departure from prior case law.' As a result, the estab-
lished actions would coexist with the new one.24
18. Id. at 84.
19. Id. A list of twenty-nine different ways in which courts circumvented lack of privity
in breach of implied warranty cases from the 1920's and 1930's well illustrates the preserva-
tion of form over substance. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALz L.J. 1099, 1124 n.153 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Reese v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 256 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA
1972) (exploding soda bottle); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313
(Fla. 1944) (poisonous canned meat product).
21. See, eg., Toombs v. Ft. Pierce Gas Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968) (propane gas);
Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (defective lawn chair); Keller v. Eagle
Army-Navy Dept. Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (insect repellent patio
torch); see also Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958) (applying the latent danger excep-
tion to a dangerous condition created by a building contractor to permit a negligence action
by an invitee who was out of privity with the contractor).
22. See, e.g., McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962) (child
of purchaser); Barfield v. Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co., 197 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
(employee of purchaser); see also McCarthy v. Florida Ladder Co., 295 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1974) (holding that privity is no longer required in an action by the ultimate user
against the manufacturer and that the elements of an action for breach of implied warranty
are: plaintiff must show he was a foreseeable user of the product, he used the product in the
intended manner at the time of the injury, the product was defective when transferred from
the warrantor, and the defect caused his injury).
23. West, 336 So. 2d at 86. For the notion that the strict liability cause of action (as
adopted by New York) was not a new cause of action, but a new name for the existing action
for breach of implied warranty, see Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395,
335 N.E.2d 275, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). Such a warranty is not a sales warranty, but sounds
distinctly in tort. It evolved from the extension of a remedy to those who were neither buy-
ers nor users of the defective product, and is based on considerations of social policy. Id.
24. The West opinion noted that the strict liability action could be a vehicle for recov-
ery if no contractual relationship exists between the injured user and the product's manu-
facturer, but an action for breach of implied warranty remains available where a contract
exists. West, 336 So. 2d at 91. See GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d DCA
1984) (When neither personal injury nor property damage was suffered, a strict liability
action did not lie despite contractual privity. An action for breach of implied warranty is
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What was a radical departure in West was the court's ac-
knowledgment that strict liability in tort for injuries caused by de-
fective products is bottomed on public policy and not doctrine.
The manufacturer's obligation is an "enterprise liability . . . one
which should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.""8
The cost of injuries from defective products is a cost of doing busi-
ness. It should be borne by the "makers of the products who put
them in the channels of trade," rather than by those injured or
damaged "who are ordinarily powerless to protect themselves."'
The manufacturer undertakes a special responsibility to the con-
suming public when it encourages use of its potentially dangerous
product by inducement and promotion.
West relied upon the leading case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,28 in which California became the first jurisdiction
to adopt a cause of action for strict product liability in tort. West
approvingly cited Greenman for the proposition that a manufac-
turer is subject to strict liability when it puts a product on the
market with knowledge that the product is to be used without in-
spection for defects.29 Subsequent Florida case law makes clear
that the converse of this proposition is not true, and rejects the
argument that a manufacturer is immunized from strict liability
when it knows its product is to be inspected for defects.30 Section
402A holds a seller of a defective product that is unreasonably
dangerous 3' subject to liability for injury to the ultimate user or to
his property if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
proper when only economic loss is suffered.).
25. West, 336 So. 2d at 92.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 84.
28. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (defective wood-turning lathe
feature of combination power tool).
29. West, 336 So. 2d at 86.
30. The court held an elevator manufacturer subject to strict liability for defects in its
elevator despite the fact that elevators are regularly inspected. Hardin v. Montgomery Ele-
vator Co., 435 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Ist DCA 1983) (Chief Judge Ervin writing for a unanimous
court); see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964) (holding car manufacturer remains strictly liable for defects despite its knowledge
that car dealer performs final inspection and preparation of car prior to sale).
31. This case note does not address whether "unreasonably dangerous" in Section 402A
means something more than defective, and if so, what that something is. Nor does it con-
sider what should be the proper test for unreasonable danger in a product that causes in-
jury. For a look at Florida's treatment of this issue, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 402A
comment i (dangerous beyond the expectations of the ordinary consumer); see also Auburn
Mach. Works, Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979) (advancing the Harper & James
balancing test of risk and utility using Professor Wade's criteria); Cassisi v. Maytag, 396 So.
2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (Chief Judge Ervin advancing the use of either standard, espe-
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product and the product is expected to and does reach the user
without substantial change in its condition as sold."
Justice Traynor made the classic statement of the policies that
undergird strict product liability nineteen years before he wrote
the Greenman opinion in his concurrence to Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno."s The basic policy priority is protecting the
public from defective products and creating an incentive to safety
by assigning the cost of defects to manufacturers and others in the
chain of distribution."
Consumers are lulled into an expectation of quality by modern
marketing techniques.3 They often are unable to identify and
prove acts of negligence responsible for the defect,"e but "even if
there is no negligence . . public policy demands that responsibil-
ity be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that reach the mar-
ket."'' Manufacturers of products are the best cost avoiders be-
cause they have superior knowledge and control of the condition of
the products that they offer for sale.'8 Further, manufacturers can
cially for defective design cases).
32. West, 336 So. 2d at 84; see supra note 10.
33. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). For a list of the policy
reasons that undergird strict product liability, see Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz.
App. 32, 37-38, 467 P.2d 256, 261-62 (CL App. 1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring) (truck lessor
should be subject to strict liability); RzsTATaM r (SacomQ) J 402A comment c.
34. "It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
that are a menace to the public." Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. In many in-
stances, the ultimate user is unable to inspect for product defects. He is brought, from far
away places, products of ever inceasing complexity. Modern manufacturing processes are
beyond the ken of the general public which has neither the means nor skill to investigate for
itself the soundness of (all but the simplest) products. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443.
35. The consumer's "erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manu-
facturers to build up confidence by advertising and trade-marks." Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 467,
150 P.2d at 443; see West, 336 So. 2d at 86.
36. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. See Prosser, supra note 19, at 1114-18;
infra note 73.
37. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 460, 150 P.2d at 440.
38. The risk of injury from defective products whose manufacturers may not have been
negligent is "a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection."
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. New Jersey courts have developed the policy of casting the
burden of loss to the party in the position of superior knowledge and control of the prod-
uct's quality and safety. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965) (holding truck lessor impliedly warrants the fitness of its vehicle to the
lessee because lessor is in the better position to know and control the condition of the truck
and to distribute losses that may result from its dangerous condition); Hennigsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960) (car buyer relies on the manufac-
turer, who controls construction, and to a lesser extent, upon the dealer, who inspects and
services the car before delivery to consumer, to protect him from injury-causing defects);
[Vol. 40:359
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spread among the consuming public the cost of purchasing insur-
ance or self-insurance against the risk of defective products .3  Fi-
nally, retailers and wholesalers also should be subject to strict lia-
bility that they may serve as a conduit to reach the manufacturer,
who is ultimately responsible.4
B. Defective Improvements and Product Liability
One can hardly argue that the need to protect the public from
defective products has diminished since Section 402A was drafted.
In Florida and elsewhere, almost irresistibly, the sweep of strict
liability doctrine has filled in the shadowy outline of Section
402A. 1
In jurisdictions that have adopted Section 402A or its
equivalent, judges frequently must decide whether strict liability
principles apply to actions for injuries caused by defective struc-
Gentile v. MacGregor Mfg. Co., 201 N.J. Super. 612, 493 A.2d 647 (Super. CL 1985) (recon-
ditioners of school districts football helmets subject to strict liability for high school player's
injuries).
39. "[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business." Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. Some say that
this rationale may have dissipated as a result of a marked increase in product liability
claims coinciding with the adoption of strict product liability actions in many jurisdictions
in the 1970's. A nationwide crisis of prohibitively costly or unavailable liability insurance for
manufacturers has been widely reported and debated. See generally Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) (Dep't of Commerce recommended act arising
out of the insurance crisis) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]; R. EPST N, MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW (1980); Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Fed-
eral Action, 63 Ns. L. Rav. 389 (1984). But see Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d
288, 293, 294 (N.H. 1983) (In holding product liability statute of repose violative of state
constitution's due process/guarantee of remedy provision, the court noted state legislative
committee's finding that the panic rise in manufacturer's insurance rates had ended nation-
wide by 1980.); Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 30
Am. U.L. Rz,. 673 (1981). For an assertion that loss spreading is a makeweight argument in
the first place, see Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 235-37, 227 A.2d 539, 545-46
(City Ct. 1967), aff'd, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
40. The Lechuga court cited Vandermark for the proposition that a retailer, who may
be the only readily available defendant, is an integral part of the overall producing and
marketing enterprise. The retailer's strict liability serves as an added incentive to safety and
affords maximum protection to the consumer, the cost of which the retailer and manufac-
turer can adjust in their ongoing business relationship. Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12
Ariz. App. 32, 38, 467 P.2d 256, 262 (Ct. App. 1970) (citing Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964)).
41. For example, Section 402A left open the question whether a bystander could hold a
manufacturer strictly liable for injuries resulting from another's use of the product. Eleven
years later, that question was answered in the affirmative in the opinion that adopted Sec-
tion 402A in Florida. See West, 336 So. 2d at 82-83, 92; see also Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
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tures,42 fixtures,43 or improvements44 to real property ("improve-
ments") that cause bodily harm or property damage.45 Injured par-
ties bring these actions against vendors, owners, building
contractors, architects, and engineers. Courts usually use one of
three approaches to analyze the threshold issue: whether the im-
provement is a product within the meaning of Section 402A.
First, a court may use a definitional approach to arrive at the
tautological holding that an improvement to realty is not a product
because it is not personalty. A good example of such ipse dixit is
found in Neumann v. Davis Water and Waste, Inc., 6 in which the
Second District Court of Appeal, without further reasoning, stated,
"[we] decline to extend the strict liability principle of West v. Cat-
erpillar . .. to structural improvements to real estate. 47 When
they reject strict liability, courts most often hold that the improve-
ment is not a product within the meaning of Section 402A.4 8 The
42. A structure has been defined as "any construction. . . artificially built up or com-
posed of parts joined together in some definite manner .. an edifice or building of any
kind." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1592 (4th ed. 1968). Case law illustrations include poles
that support electric wires, railroad tracks, mines, or pits. Id.
43. A fixture has been defined as "a chattel attached to realty... [b]ecoming accessory
to it and part and parcel of it." Id. at 766.
44. An improvement has been defined as "a valuable addition made to property (usu-
ally real estate) or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs
...costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt
it to new or further purposes." Id. at 890. Because fixtures and structures are types of im-
provements, the latter term generally will be used herein.
45. See, e.g., McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1348 (D. Colo.
1980) (An oil refinery is not a product because strict liability policies are not applicable to
defective structures. A negligence remedy is adequate because builders cannot easily limit
their liability by disclaimers, improvements can be inspected more meaningfully for defects
than can products, and defects can be traced more easily to builders than to manufactur-
ers.); Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (sewage
treatment tank is not a product). But see Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 F.
Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd mem., 642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981) (skip bridge in a blast
furnace is a product).
46. 433 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
47. Id. at 561.
48. In reaching such a conclusion, a court may resort to interpreting Section 402A as if
it were a statute. For example, it has been reasoned that defective buildings, if not improve-
ments generally, might not engender strict liability because the chapter of the Restatement
(Second) in which Section 402A is found is entitled "Suppliers of Chattels." Abdul-Warith,
488 F. Supp. at 312 (distinguishing cases where buildings were held not to be products
within the meaning of section 404A from those dealing with a "piece of equipment"). But
the Restatement, by its own terms, places section 402A in the chapter on suppliers of chat-
tels for "convenience of reference." See RESTATEMENT (SRCoND) § 402A comment a (1965).
At least one court, in Lowrie v. City of Evanston, has relied upon the fact that the Restate-
ment treats with builders of improvements and sellers or owners of real property in other
sections, and that buildings are missing from an illustrative list of products in comment d to
section 402A. 50 II1. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923 (App. Ct. 1977). But comment d states
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definitional approach is the easy way out.
Second, the court may ask by what method the product came
before the public and what role the defendant played in putting it
there. This question is usually couched in terms of whether the
improvement was put into the "stream of commerce," and it really
addresses whether the defendant can be called a seller within the
meaning of Section 402A. The court may thus avoid the question
whether the improvement is a product.4 '
that the rule of Section 402A extends to "any product" before it gives illustrations drawn
from well known cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A comment d (1965). The Lowrie
court purported to rely on "policy reasons" for denying a strict liability claim for .defective
design of a public parking garage. It cited only the availability of-other remedies, as did the
McClanahan court, and it could not resist designating cases that applied strict liability to
defective homes as those dealing with products incorporated into homes and not homes as
products per se. Neither could it resist relying upon the intent of the "framers" of section
402A. Lowrie, 50 IIl. App. 3d at 383, 365 N.E.2d at 928.
49. One court. has stated:
The phrase "stream of commerce" is not found in the text of § 402A, nor in
the acompanying comments. However, the phrase has been used by the courts to
make the distinction between the one time or casual seller to whom strict prod-
ucts liability does not apply and a defendant engaged in the business of selling
products as required by Section 402A(1)(a).
Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 118 II. App. 3d 520, 530, 455 N.E.2d 142, 149 (App.
Ct. 1983). See supra note 10.
Without reaching the issue whether the improvement is a product, while acknowledging
that the defendant is not an occasional seller, a court may hold that the contractor has not
put the improvement into the stream of commerce if construction is not finished or the
owner retains control over it when injury occurs. One Illinois court engaged in mind-bending
reasoning to justify dismissal of a strict product liability complaint against a manufacturer/
installer of a highway guardrail. In Maddan v. R.A. Cullinan & Son, Inc., a highway guard-
rail had been partially installed, without an offset deflector on the end facing oncoming
traffic. 88 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 411 N.E.2d 139 (App. Ct. 1980). As a result, when a car struck
the guardrail, the length of the car was impaled upon it and the driver's leg was severed. It
may be that the installer could have avoided the problem had he installed his guardrails in
the direction of traffic (so the deflector was installed first) instead of in some other fashion.
The court rested on the notion that because the state had not yet accepted the guardrail,
the manufacturer had not placed it in the stream of commerce because it was still within the
manufacturer's control. Id. at 140. The court attempted to distinguish "strong language" by
its supreme court to the effect that a highway sign was a product subject to strict liability
principles by pointing out that the state had accepted the sign in Hunt v. Blasius and that
the sign had been fully finished. Id. at 141 (construing Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384
N.E. 2d 368 (1978)). A cursory glance at the "manufacturer's control" language of Section
402A indicates that it relates to proof of defectiveness, causation, and misuse of the product.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A comment g, h; see also Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (Chief Judge Ervin writing for the panel). Nowhere in Section
402A is it suggested that an unfinished product, offered for use as if it were finished, is not
in the stream of commerce. See Maddan, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 1032, 411 N.E.2d at 142 (Barry,
J., dissenting). This is an especially important point where the public has no choice but to
use the unfinished guardrail as if it were finished, and its unfinished state makes it much
more dangerous than it would be if completed. Cf. Van Iderstine v. Lane Pipe Corp., 107
Misc. 2d 981, 436 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Sup. Ct. 1981), aff'd, 89 A.D.2d 459, 455 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App.
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The third and most forthright approach is to question whether
holding this defendant strictly liable in these circumstances will
serve or disserve the policies that undergird the strict product lia-
bility cause of action. If strict liability policies will be advanced,
the court will hold that the defective "thing" is a product. 0 The
hidden policy reason, seldom articulated, is the fear that strict lia-
bility will drive up unreasonably the cost of the item. This reason
finds its best expression in cases rejecting strict liability for essen-
tial products, the cost of which may already be high, such as prod-
ucts used in medical care.61 One might argue that private housing
and public facilities such as highways are too essential and too
costly to allow either passing along to the public increased settle-
ment costs that are assumed to result from applying strict liability,
or impairing the defendant's ability to provide the necessary prod-
uct if he cannot pass along the costs.
Whether they take a definitional or policy approach to reading
Section 402A, courts nonetheless conclude that they should catego-
rize some improvements as products, that is, that strict liability is
appropriate." The resultant line of cases in a single jurisdiction
may be difficult to reconcile.
53
Div. 1982) (court granted dismissal of breach of warranty and strict liability counts against
county where plaintiff had alleged guardrail was defective, but manufacturer remained sub-
ject to liability on both theories).
50. For an analysis of the approaches to categorizing improvements and "things" of
other sorts, see What Is Or Is Not A Product Within The Meaning Of Section 402A, 57
MARQ. L Rzv. 625 (1974). For an excellent analysis of the Illinois cases, see Wunsch, The
Definition Of A Product For The Purposes Of Section 402A, 50 INS. COUNSEL J. 344 (1983).
51. See, e.g., Brody v. Overlook Hospital, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (Super Ct
1973) (blood bank supplying, at no charge, blood that was possibly contaminated, to private,
nonprofit hospital was "charitable, voluntary organization"); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J.
Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Super. Ct. 1967) (dentist not strictly liable for defective hypoder-
mic needle that broke in patient's jaw).
52. One Illinois appellate court has suggested what sounds like a sales law approach,
wherein the court considers the separate "identity" of the improvement, much like the sev-
erability test of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys.,
118 11. App. 3d 520, 530, 455,N.E.2d 142, 149 (App. Ct. 1983) (mail sorter in postal facility
is a product for strict liability purposes because it is not an "indivisible component part of
the building or structure" itself). Ironically, the UCC comment states that "[tihe word 'fix-
tures' has been avoided because of the diverse definitions of this term, the test of 'severance
without material harm being substituted.'" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.2-107 UNIFORM COMMER-
Cl. CODE (West 1966).
53. See Wunsch, supra note 50. Illinois courts, for example, have held that a grain stor-
age tank was a product, paying lip service to strict liability policies and asserting that the
availability of other theories of recovery does not weaken the policies supporting application
of strict liability, in an action to recover for purely economic loss (the tank leaked, but did
no damage to other property) where no one suffered bodily harm. Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
National Tank Co., 92 I1. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (Ct. App. 1980). Compare id. with
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Injured persons frequently seek to hold designers, architects,
and engineers strictly liable for defective improvements that cause
injury. Using a goods/services analysis resembling that used under
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code,"' a court may avoid
deciding whether the improvement is a product." Thus, if a prod-
uct sale is incidental to the sale of services,16 no strict liability ac-
tion will lie. Likewise, if a design alone is sold, and the designer
does not take any profit from sales of materials or the finished im-
provement, no strict liability action will lie. s7
Cox v. Shaffer, 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (Super. Ct. 1973) (silo is not a product).
The court in Lowrie held that the parking garage from which a patron fell to his death, was
not a product. Lowrie v. City of Evanston, Ill. App. 3d 376, 365 N.E.2d 923 (App. Ct. 1977).
This decision was likewise said to have a policy basis, but the stated reasons were the availa-
bility of other theories of recovery and a stunted reading of section 402A in light of its
"framers" intent. Id. When a suicidal patient fell from the fourth floor of a sheltered care
facility and then alleged a defect in the windows without guardrails to which she had access,
the court asserted that policies prevented it from holding the facility was a product because
the defendant was not a mass producer of such facilities and could not spread the cost of
the loss. Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 472, 368 N.E.2d 803 (1977).
Although the court in Boddie held the bulk mail sorter that injured a worker to be a prod-
uct, and discussed previous Illinois cases in terms of policy reasons, the basis for the Boddie
decision was a test of "indivisible identity," Boddie, 118 IM. App. 3d at 529, 455 N.E. 2d at
149. See Heller v. Cadral Corp., 84 Il1. App. 3d 677, 406 N.E. 2d 88 (1977) (holding condo-
minium unit is not a product, other remedies exist, no mass production, only economic loss
suffered). These cases are all over the map, and talented counsel can use them in the best
common law tradition. Boddie attempts to reconcile them, but ends up with a formalistic
definition. The two most serious injuries were suffered in falls from buildings that were held
not to be products. The hidden hand of policy was at work. The defendants were a mental
health facility (Immergluck) and a city (Lowrie) performing public functions with little ca-
pacity for loss spreading in areas where loss spreading might not be desirable.
54. The test for inclusion under the UCC is whether the contract's primary thrust or
purpose is the rendition of a service with goods incidentally involved, such as a contract
with an artist for a painting, or a sale with the rendition of a ser ice incidentally involved,
such as installation of a water heater in a bathroom. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960
(8th Cir. 1974).
55. See infra note 106; note 57.
56. See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968) (engineers-
carcinogenic dust); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Super. Ct. 1967)
(dentist-hypodermic needle). Compare Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A. 2d 697
(1966) (because beautician is not a professional, and is engaged in a commercial enterprise,
an action will lie for strict liability or breach of implied warranty for sale of permanent wave
that causes dermatitis) with Epstein v. Giannatasio, 25 Conn. Sup. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (Conn.
C.P. 1963) (because contract with beautician is primarily for a service, no action will lie for
breach of implied warranty for sale of permanent wave that causes dermatitis).
57. Where nothing but a design is sold, the policies of strict product liability support
not holding the designer strictly liable. Design services are not mass-marketed as are prod-
ucts, and the designer cannot easily pass on the assumed increased settlement costs of strict
liability. Perhaps more importantly, the designer who sells only a design gains only inciden-
tal benefit from the manufacturer's success with the resultant product. See Gagne v. Bar-
tran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954) (Those who sell services for the guidance of others
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Despite judicial reluctance to categorize improvements as
products, many jurisdictions have applied strict liability or implied
warranties to mass produced homes and their appurtenances."
The New Jersey case of Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, Inc.5 e fol-
lowed soon after Greenman and held a developer of tract housing
strictly liable for a defective hot water system. The Schipper court
reasoned that mass builders of homes and manufacturers of chat-
tels are similarly situated in that both impliedly represent the fit-
ness of their products to purchasers who are in a subordinate bar-
gaining position and are capable of only a superficial inspection.
Mass builders, like manufacturers, "are in the better economic po-
sition to bear the loss. .. than [is] the injured party who justifia-
bly relied on the developer's skill and implied representation."' ' 0
Custom builders of homes that incorporate injury-causing de-
are not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct.); Del Mar Beach Club
Owners Asa'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct.
App. 1981) (architects, soil, and structural engineers of defective planned unit development
were not subject to strict liability); Fisher v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 131,
167 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1980) (developer who designs and builds dedicated subdivision:
roads is providing something more akin to a service than a product); Audlane Lumber &
Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assoc. Inc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964) (building
engineer merely warrants that he has exercised his skills according to a reasonable standard
of care; the "tangible evidence" of his skill is not warranted). For a look at a society that
held professionals absolutely liable without fault, see G.DRIVxR & J. Mnu, 2 THz BAsBno-
NiAN LAws at 83 (1955) (citing the LAws or HAMMUABI § 229-32: a builder who designs a
building that falls down and causes the death of the householder shall be put to death).
58. See Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App.
3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding condo developer subject to strict liability
for numerous defects, including subsidence of grading and paving, rusty doors and windows,
leaky parking garages, tennis, courts that chipped and peeled); Hyman v. Gordon, 35 CaL
App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1973) (holding custom builder strictly liable for
defective design of garage with respect to placement of hot water heater); Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding mass builder
of homes subject to strict liability for defective radiant heating system); Berman v. Water-
gate W. Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978) (holding builder, sponsor, and company that mar-
keted cooperative apartments each played an integral part in placing a defective unit in the
stream of commerce and thus each was accountable to ultimate consumer on strict liability
or warranty principles).
59. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
60. Id. at 89-93, 207 A.2d at 325-26. See Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944); supra text accompanying notes 33-38. The California courts have developed this
application of strict liability. See Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting
Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct. App. 1981) (pools, decks, and improve-
ments that go with the sale of a home); Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co., 34 Cal. App.
3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1973) (water supply systems); Avner v. Longridge Es-




fects may be subject to strict liability. In Hyman v. Gordon," a
water heater installed in a garage by the designer/builder caused a
fire that injured a child at play. A California court of appeal held
the builder strictly liable for the design defect in the "larger" prod-
uct (the garage) because of the placement of the heater.2 The
court reasoned that a "defect may emerge from the mind of the
designer as well as from the hand of the workman."" The builder
was not a mass builder or seller of homes, but the policy of casting
the burden of the loss upon the one who created the defect
supervened.
If only mass builders of homes or mass producers of goods are
subject to strict liability, it pays to be a custom builder. The teach-
ing of Hyman is that parties injured by defective custom built im-
provements should get the same protection as parties injured by
defective mass produced improvements and, to that end, courts
should hold custom builders to the same standard of liability as
mass builders.
C. Defective Improvements in Florida
In Florida, first purchasers of residences receive from the
seller an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability with re-
spect to the home, its contents, and the building lot upon which it
stands. 4 In Conklin v. Hurley," the Supreme Court of Florida
noted the chattel-like quality of mass-produced homes and the
lack of knowledge and bargaining power of the typical home buyer,
who may commit the family's savings to one or two homes in a
61. 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1973).
62. "[A]n article or a machine may function safely in one location in the design but not
another." Id. at 771, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
63. Id. (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972) (en banc) (defective design of locking mechanism for trays in bread truck)). See
Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981) (holding car manufacturer subject to
strict liability for design defects).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 718.03 (1985); Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983) (hold-
ing no implied warranty remedy for defective seawalls inured to investors who purchased
lots sans residences); Port Sewall Harbor & Tennis Club Owners Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n of Martin County, 463 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (holding subdivision
roads, footbridges, and related drainage areas are not. impliedly warranted); Hesson v.
Walmsley Constr. Co., 422 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (holding building lot is impliedly
warranted when home and lot are bought together); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th
DCA), cert. discharged, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (holding first purchaser of condo unit
receives implied warranty of habitability, which is shorthand for implied warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability as applied to residences).
65. 428 So. 2d 654, 658-59 (Fla. 1983).
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lifetime."e The homeowner's warranty remedy in Florida focuses on
the home, which is merchantable or fit for its intended purpose
because "it works."' a
Because Florida's courts and legislature have limited the im-
plied warranty for improvements to residences" and the availabil-
ity of the remedy to first purchasers," the scope of the warrantor's
duty has resisted expansion beyond its contractual origins into the
larger tort zone where privity is not necessary. There has been vir-
tually no application of the otherwise well established action for
breach of implied warranty absent privity to personal injuries
caused by defective improvements.70
Implied warranties are associated with chattels and sales law,
and although the privity rule that lingers in Florida's residential
warranty law is hardly justifiable, the party injured by a defective
improvement in Florida will seldom have a remedy for breach of
implied warranty. He or she must rely on a negligence action
against the seller, building contractor, or architect." Consequently,
66. Id. at 659.
67. The jurisdictions are split on applying strict liability to homes. A majority of juris-
dictions extend an implied warranty or strict liability remedy to first purchasers of mass
produced homes or condominiums For a list of jurisdictions extending an implied warranty
or strict liability remedy to first purchasers of new homes, see Berman v. Watergate W.,
Inc., 391 A.2d 1357, 1358 (D.C. 1978); Conklin, 428 So. 2d at 658-59 (list of 33 states recog-
nizing an implied warranty in the sale of new homes).
68. See supra note 64.
69. Id. See Alvarez v. DeAguirre, 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (implied warranty
remedy not available to lessee of home); Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978) (implied warranty remedy not available to second owner of home).
70. See Armor Elevator Co. v. Wood, 312 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied,
330 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1976) (pre-West breach of implied warranty action against manufacturer
for wrongful death of a workman where the locking mechanism of an elevator was defective,
causing it to fall during installation). The other reported cases allowing an action for breach
of implied warranty based on defective improvements in Florida virtually all allege eco-
nomic loss or property damage and seek the cost of correction as damages. See, e.g., Conklin
v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983) (seawall collapsed); Hesson v. Walmsley Costr. Co., 422
So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (house settled on lot, cracks resulted); Biscayne Roofing Co.
v. Palmetto Fairway Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (leaky roof);
Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominiums, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1981) (decorative fencing, roof assembly, aluminum awning windows); Gable v. Silver,
258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (replacement of air conditioner). But see Hutchings v.
Harry, 242 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (In a case that was pre-Gable and pre- West,
the court held that a visitor had no implied warranty action against the architect, building
contractor, and seller of a home for injuries caused by an allegedly defective glass door that
shattered. It stated only that "there is no action for breach of warranty under the facts of
this case.").
71. See, e.g., Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973) (action against architect for
negligence in wrongful death of workman who fell during construction of apartment build-
ing); Le May v. USH Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (shopping mall
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proof of a defect is not sufficient. Because the plaintiff must prove
negligence, the chances of recovery are less than in an action for
breach of implied warranty or strict liability, where proof of an un-
reasonably dangerous1 2 defect has the effect of a prima facie show-
ing of negligence." The chances of recovery are further reduced
because Florida law makes the injured party's suit a malpractice
action. 4 The malpractice action can be defended by a showing, of
conformity to a professional standard of care, an insufficient de-
fense to a simple negligence action.
Florida courts prefer not to face squarely the question whether
the policies of strict liability require categorizing a particular de-
fective improvement as a product, that is, whether this improve-
ment and this defendant in these circumstances should be subject
to strict liability. Definitional solutions are customary. The Neu-
mann court hid behind a chattels/improvements distinction.7 6 In
patron tripped and fell over steps that were difficult to see, sued architect for negligent
design of mall).
72. See supra note 31.
73. Strict liability means negligence per se, "the effect of which is to remove the burden
from the user of proving specific acts of negligence." West, 336 So. 2d at 90. Removing that
burden was a major impetus to the emergence of the cause of action in the first place. See
Prosser, supra note 19, at 1114-18. Even with the aid of a res ipsa instruction on negligence,
proof of a defect will not alone win a case or a settlement. Consequently, manufacturers
have less incentive to make safer products because they have more incentive to defend law-
suits. To exacerbate matters, sellers or jobbers who might otherwise be "strictly" liable may
simply not be negligent at all. Id.
74. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Harry, 242 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (negligence of
professional [architect] is the failure to comply with recognized standards of good practice
in the same locality at the same time). The Supreme Court of Florida has stated:
[Ain architect may be liable for negligence in failing to exercise the ordinary
skills of his profession, which results in the erection of an unsafe structure
whereby anybody lawfully on the premises is injured. . . all that was said in the
foregoing discussion of the immunities and liabilities of architects also may be
said of the immunities and liabilities of engineers, or, for that matter, any other
independent contractors.
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56, 61 (Fla. 1973). See Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development
Concepts, 373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Le May v. USH Properties, Inc., 338 So. 2d
1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
75. For an argument that malpractice standards should not control negligence actions
by those out of privity with professional defendants, see Cubito v. Kreigsberg, 69 A.D.2d
738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 1979). Malpractice, in its strict sense, means the negli-
gence of a professional in his relations with his client or patient. An action for malpractice
springs from the correlative rights and duties assumed by the parties through the relation-
ship, and the wrongful conduct of a professional (architect), in rendering services to his
client, that causes injury to a party outside the relationship, is simple negligence. Id. at 742,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
76. 433 So. 2d at 559. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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Alvarez v. DeAguirre,7" the Third District Court of Appeal gave
short shrift to a strict liability count brought by the lessee of a
house damaged by fire against the contractor who installed an al-
legedly defective circuit breaker. The court relied upon the rule
that the homeowner's implied warranty remedy requires privity,
and it stated merely that it was "settled that no cause of action
will lie." 7' But the homeowner's implied warranty remedy is based
on contract policies of inequality of bargaining power and inability
to inspect.7 ' In Florida, the strongest public policy emerging from
the warranty cases is protecting a family from having its pocket
picked of its savings by purveyors of shoddy work.s"
Strict liability, like all tort law, has compensation of the inno-
cent injured party as its strongest policy.'1 Unlike implied war-
ranty, strict product liability shifts losses from injuries caused by
defective products to manufacturers as an incentive to market
safer products. It only incidentally focuses on the transaction be-
tween the seller and the user of the product."e The Alvarez court's
conclusion, that strict liability is not applicable because implied
warranty is not applicable, is discount jurisprudence.
The policies underlying strict liability require that it subsume'
the contractual implied warranty and its privity rule. It makes no
sense that the visitor injured by a defective water heater in a mo-
tor home has a strict liability remedy, but the visitor to a home
without wheels, injured by the same defective water heater, has no
remedy at all if he cannot prove malpractice."
Policies generally are no better explored when Florida courts
hold that strict liability is applicable to a case involving a defective
improvement. The courts have, however, been more receptive to,
strict liability actions for personal injury or property damage
caused by defective building supplies (or other items that might be
regarded as components of the larger product) than for defective
77. 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
7& Id. at 216 (citing cases rejecting strict liability actions for defective residences
brought by owners who were not first purchasers and had no warranty remedy because they
were out of privity with the sellers or contractors).
79. See spra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
80. See, eg., Conklin, 428 So. 2d at 658, n.8, 659.
81. "He that is injured should be recompensed." The Case of The Thorns, 1466 Y.B. 6
Ed. 4, 7a, pi. 18, easily found in KMTON. KERTON, SARGOmCH & STemR, ToRT AND Accl-
DENT LAW 134 (West 1983) (The original tort liability was absolute liability without fault,
and cast the burden of proof (of exculpation) upon the defendant.).
82. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.




improvements per se. 4 Roof tiles"8 and trusses, 6 driveway paint,87
stucco mix,88 and elevators8 ' have been subjects of strict liability
actions.
The curious result is that a piece of untempered glass that
shatters before installation may subject its manufacturer and seller
to strict liability, but a piece that shatters after installation will
not, even though all parties involved know that its ultimate use
begins upon installation in a building."
Another apparent inconsistency results from the customary
treatment of industrial machinery. In Florida, strict liability ac-
tions for defective industrial equipment do not receive such close
scrutiny on the "improvement" issue, and it generally passes unno-
84. Water heaters and gas stoves are on the illustrative list of products in the com-
ments to Section 402A. These items are "improvements" for the purposes of this case note
and are usually regarded as fixtures by virtue of "permanent" installation. See RESTATE-
MENT (SzcoND) § 402A comment d.
85. Gory Associated Indus. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 358 So. 2d 93 (Fla.
4th DCA 1978).
86. Tri-County Truss Co. v. Leonard, 467 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).
87. Halpryn v. Highland Ins. Co., 426 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
88. Adobe Bldg. Centers, Inc. v. L.D. Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
89. Hardin v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 435 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Ist DCA 1983); Armor v.
Wood, 312 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Radiant Elec. Co.,
55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1974) (the leading case for arguing that im-
plied warranties apply to building contractors' services as well as the goods they install). In
Radiant Electric, the electrical wiring was statutorily warranted, before and after installa-
tion, under the UCC. The manner of installation was also impliedly warranted, although it
was a service, especially in view of the fact that the goods were to handle a "dangerous
force," electricity. See City of Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 384 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1978)
(roof base mixture that leaked); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d
329, 331, n.332 (Fla. 1983) (In a breach of warranty action for contamination of foodstuffs in
a warehouse based on a defective chemical hardening agent which failed in repairs to con-
crete floor and sent noxious fumes into the air, Florida's supreme court noted that a strict
liability count was conspicious by its absence with no discussion of any "incorporated into
improvements rule."); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (oft-cited case applying implied warranty absent privity to suit
for property damage based on defective cinder blocks); see also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) (steel roof joists). Compare Worrell v. Barnes,
484 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971) (holding contractor strictly liable for defective gas fitting which he
installed) with Alvarez v. DeAguirre, 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (denying strict
liability action against electrical contractor for defective fusebox or wiring).
90. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985)
(en banc) (The Supreme Court of California recently held that a tenant had a strict liability
action against a landlord for injuries caused by untempered glass in shower door.). Compare
Hutchings v. Harry, 242 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (no reason given for holding that
plaintiff had no action for breach of implied warranty against seller, builder, or architect
where visiting child was injured by glass door that shattered) with Hyman v. Gordon, 35
Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1973) (visiting child has strict liability action
against builder for injuries from fire caused by hot water heater). See generally supra notes
61-63 and accompanying text.
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ticed, even if the machine is permanently affixed."1
Strict liability in 'tort upon proof of an unreasonably danger-
ous defect" has the effect of negligence per se, and the action is
standing in, if not bottomed on, the predecessor action of implied
warranty absent privity.9" A hybrid doctrinal basis and the fact
that public policy is really the engine of the cause of action" have
made it difficult to sort out the case law. Not surprisingly, the re-
sult line is wavy where defective improvements are involved. Pro-
tecting the otherwise defenseless public from defective products
should take priority. Courts withholding an equal measure of pro-
tection from those injured by defective improvements usually rely
upon formalistic distinctions that are paper-thin."5
91. See Clement v. Rouslle Corp., 372 So. 2d 1156 (Fla tat DCA 1979) (punch press);
Watson v. Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (fruit sampling
machine); see also Deleon v. Commercial Mfg. & Supply Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 336, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (Ct. App. 1983) (A worker lost an arm while cleaning a custom designed and built-
in-place fruit bin used in a cannery. In a strict liability action, summary judgment for the
defendant manufacturer waseieversed, because the manufacturer failed to show that the
unsafe cleaning method was jnforeseeable, even if the bin was misused.).
92. See supra note 31.
93. The West court usedfthe negligence per se analogy. Proof of a defect is sufficient to:
get to the jury on causation. See supra note 73. A court might view a strict product liability
action as a breach of implied warranty action by another name. See supra note 23.
94. The courts closely identified the traditional warranty with contract principles, that
is, reliance on a seller's express or implied assertions, notice of breach, and disclaimers.
Implied warranty absent privity was the "freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort
and contract." The Restatement (Second) started over with an essentially clean slate in
Section 402A, borrowing from established actions in tort which recognized a strict liability,
such as those based on abnormally dangerous activities, keeping wild animals, or libel See
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 50 MINN. L Ray. 791,
799-805 (1966); RarATzmaT (ScoNm) I 402A comment m; supra notes 33-39 and accom-,
panying text.
95. Florida's legislature has enacted one statute of repose for actions based on defective
products, FL& STAT. 1 95.031(2) (1985), and another for actions based on defective improve-
menta, FL& STAT. 1 95.11(3)(c) (1985). Both statutes had absolute claim periods of 12 years
from first purchase or occupancy, until, in 1980, the legislature changed the claim period for
a defective improvement to 15 years, FLA. STAT. J 95.11(3)(c), and added a preamble which
recited the need for such a repose period (because of the insurance crisis) after the supreme
court held the predecessor statute unconstitutional in Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369
So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979). See Ch. 80-322, Laws of Fla. (1980). The supreme court has held the
"new" statute facially valid and has taken the bizarre view that it is constitutional as ap-
plied so long as a plaintiff's cause of action is not time-barred before it accrues. Universal
Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1984). The supreme court has likewise held the
product liability repose statute facially valid but unconstitutional as applied to bar an ac-
tion before accrual. Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981), on
remand, 399 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d
874 (Fla. 1980). The supreme court's recent opinion in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., states that
the court now retreats from Batilla and that the product liability repose statute does not
violate the Florida constitution. No. 66,198 (Aug. 29, 1985) (10 F.L.W. 427 (Aug. 30, 1985)).




A. The Paver Is a Manufacturer, the Paving Mix Is a Product
Using a definitional approach, which Florida courts have fa-
vored, the First District Court of Appeal correctly held that Chad-
bourne was a manufacturer. Under Section 402A and the principles
of West and its progeny, manufacturing need not be a complex
process.'" Mixture of two products to make a third is sufficient."s
Supplying unprocessed products is also sufficient."
The building supply cases decided by Florida courts require a
holding that paving mix is a product for strict liability purposes."
Adobe Building Centers Inc. v. L.D. Reynolds'00 largely resolves
this issue. There, a supplier of Portland cement and mortar mix
sold them to contractors who combined them with sand and water
to make a stucco mix. The stucco damaged the exteriors of the
houses to which it was applied, and the residential developers who
owned the houses (and who had hired the contractors) sued the
supplier on a strict liability theory for property damage. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's directed
verdict against the supplier, and the supreme court dismiss a peti-
beyond the facts of Pullum, where the product caused injury before the repose period ex-
pired, but the plaintiff filed his action after the period expired. Id. The effect of these re-
pose statutes, which courts have respected, is*to similarly protect suppliers of defective
products and defective improvements. But the courts themselves are responsible for the
dissimilar treatment of the victims of defects. Courts may deny those injured by defective
improvements the strict liability remedy available to those injured by defective chattels, and
may, in some circumstances, deny any remedy. See Neumann v. Davis Water & Waste Co.,
433 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (Neumann is the only Florida case that has seized upon
a "structural improvements to real property" notion to justify dismissing a strict liability
action.). The water tank in Neumann would clearly be a product under the MODEL AcT. See
infro note 96; cf. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532
F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding one million gallon, built-in-place water tank was impliedly
warranted as goods under the UCC and Illinois law); Hutchings v. Harry, 242 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 3d DCA 1970).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) I 402A comment f. See MODEL ACT I 102(e), at 62,717
("Product" means any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an as-
sembled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for introduction into trade or
commerce.).
97. Adobe Bldg. Centers, Inc. v. L. D. Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A comment e.
99. See Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1984); Tri-
County Truss Co. v Leonard, 467 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Hardin v. Montgomery
Elevator Co., 435 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); see also Haipryn v. Highland Ins. Co., 426
So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Gory Assoc. Indus. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal, 358
So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
100. 403 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
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tion for review. 101
That the developers in Adobe were not ultimate users (in the
sense of those who buy homes to live in them) did not foreclose the
supplier's liability. Thus, the supplier of building materials of sim-
ple origin is subject to strict liability for defects that appear upon
their mixture and application to the surface of an improvement.10 2
Where bodily harm and not property damage occurs, strict liability
is more, not less, appropriate. The strict product liability action
developed, after all, to protect against products whose defects
cause injury to human beings.103
Chadbourne performed the functions of both the supplier and
contractor in Adobe. lie made the sand-asphalt mix and applied it
to the road. Under Adobe, the DOT or Walton County would have
a strict liability action against Chadbourne for any property dam-
age which resulted from a defect because they were users of the
paving mix.10 The motorist injured by the defect should be no less
protected. The motorist is, after all, the ultimate user contem-
101. Adobe Bldg. Centers'-Inc. v. Reynolds, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1981).
102. Adobe, 403 So. 2d alt1036, 1036 (Hurley, J., concurring). Neumann and Alvarez
are not sensibly distinguishable from the instant case because the defendants therein were
sellers and not manufacturers, despite Chief Judge Ervin's attempt to so distinguish them.
See Vaughn. 462 So. 2d at 515, 516. Strict product liability is a seller's liability. See RE-
sTATmaT (SECom) I 402A. Neumann is really a design case, where the plaintiff should
have alleged that design defects in the tank and the larger product, the treatment complex
itself, allowed a three-year-old access to the area and enabled the child to get atop the
treatment tank. Even if the court applied strict liability to Neumann's facts, it seems that
there was no proof the tank was defectively manufactured or assembled. See Neumann v.
Davis Water & Waste, Inc., 433 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The designer or archi-
tect who lays out a complex such as the one in Neumann is probably not subject to strict
liability for design defects under the architect's rule. See supra note 57. If a governmental
agency is the designer, it al has a planning/discretionary immunity. See infra note 106.
Alvarez was a sales warranty case, enforcing the privity requirement of the homeowner's
implied warranty against a lessee's argument that he should be regarded as if he was a
purchaser, and further, that he should be regarded as if he was a first purchaser. The Alva-
rez court assumed that no strict liability action would lie unless a warranty action did, al-
though the policies supporting each are different. Because the plaintiff suffered property
damage and not bodily harm, the strict liability action may have seemed less compelling to
the court. See Alvarez v. DeAguirre, 395 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Alvarez comes out
differently with no privity rule. It should.
103. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 902, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla 1976);
infra note 105.
104. "Consumers include not only those who in fact consume the product, but also
those who prepare it for consumption... consumption includes all ultimate uses for which
the product is intended." REsTATE&4Er (SECOND) § 402A comment i. The stream of com-
merce terminates in a delta, wider at its mouth than at its source. Adobe, 403 So. 2d at 1036
(Hurley, J., concurring). Note that Chadbourne's strict liability does not require that he be a
manufacturer. Id. at 1033.
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plated by all parties.105
In order to affirm the decision of the First District Court of
Appeal, it is unnecessary for the Supreme Court of Florida to hold
that Walton County Road 1087 is a product. It must merely hold
that the paving mix is.'"s A development-conscious state such as
Florida must give incentives for creating safe improvements with-
out giving disincentives to creating any improvements, but few are
the situations in which the public is at greater risk than when it
takes to the highway. 10
The facts of the instant case are unusual. It is not an action
alleging the defective design or construction of the county road
(the larger product). It will not expose the state to liability, and
even if it did, the state would be shielded by a planning/discretion-
ary immunity and a professional services argument. 108 Finally and
105. Section 402A is entitled "Special Liability of Seller of Products for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer." The reference to property damage is in the text of the rule. REATE-
MENT (SEcoND) § 402A.
106. A desire to keep the state's exposure under control largely motivates judicial reluc-
tance to categorize highways as products. See Maddan, 411 N.E.2d at 140-41 ("Classify a
guardrail as a product and the courts will next be confronted with the assertion that state
planted trees, culverts, bridges and highways themselves are products."). But the state has a
two-tiered defense. Courts typically characterize designing and supplying highways as a
planning function protected by a discretionary immunity. See, e.g., Department of Transp.
v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982); Hall v. State, 106 Misc. 2d 860, 435 N.Y.S.2d 663
(Ct. Cl. 1981). Beyond the immunity hurdle, the state may defend with a professional ser-
vices argument. If only design defects are alleged, the architect's defense is available. See,
e.g., Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Assoc., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla.
2d DCA 1964). If the plaintiff alleges construction defects, courts have held providing
roads, including design and manufacture, to be a mixed transaction, but primarily a service,
with an incidental transmission of a product. See, e.g., Hall, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 665. Develop-
ers may resort to the same defense theory. See Milam v. Midland Corp., 282 Ark. 15, 665
S.W.2d 284 (1984) (not holding dedicated subdivision road not to be a product, but holding
residental developer not to be a manufacturer of roads, so services issue not reached, except
in the sense of mixed transaction in which the road was incidentally supplied); Fisher v.
Morrison Homes, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 131, 167 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1981).
107. Defectively designed and maintained or obsolete roads are overlooked mass killers.
Each year, deaths equal to the total of personnel killed in Vietnam or Korea take place on
highways. As of 1977, 90% of United States roads had been created prior to the 1950's, that
is, before standards of road design began to emerge. Kuhlman, Legal Problems Created by
the Killer Roads of the United States, 19 FORUM 269 (Winter 1984). "It is seldom that an
accident results from a single cause. There are usually several influences affecting the situa-
tion at any given time. These can be separated into three groups: the human element, the
vehicle element and the highway element." Id. at 270, n.21 (citing AASHO, A PoucY ON
GEOMETRIc DESIGN OF RURAL HIGHWAYS 122 (1965)).
108. See supra note 85. Louisiana's civil code permits strict liability actions against the
state for defective highways. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La.
1980); Tischler v. City of Alexandria, 471 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (shoulder drop off
and a utility pole placed too close to the road); Howell v. State Dep't of Transp., 467 So. 2d
629 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (road surface slippery when wet).
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fundamentally, applying the case law to the narrow issue before
the supreme court requires a holding that building supplies remain
products upon incorporation into an improvement.
B. The Stream of Commerce
Although the phrase sometimes seems shrouded in mystery,
the "stream of commerce" is just another name for the "channels
of trade" descibed by the Schipper court or the "overall marketing
enterprise" considered by the California courts.1 "9 Ultimate users
are exposed to products by suppliers in business to make such ex-
posure happen. Although certain circumstances may stretch the
concept of a sale by a seller, such is not the case here.
Under Florida law, the contractor clearly put the paving mix
into the stream of commerce. Chadbourne sold the mix to the
state. In Florida, custom building a product for a single purchaser
results in a sale under Section 402A if the transaction is essentially
commercial in nature and the supplier engages in such transactions
with regularity. 11" The purpose of the stream of commerce concept
is not to create some iew "constructive" privity, but to address the
question whether a product has been sold at all within the mean-
ing of Section 402A.111
Custom builders, especially those who build products for use
by the general public, have no less a responsibility to the intended
109. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965); see
alao Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 259, 391 P.2d 168, 173, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 899-90 (1964); supra note 49.
110. Hartman v. Opelika Mach. & Welding Co., 414 So. 2d 1105, 1106-07 (FIa 1st DCA
1982). The California courts have looked at whether the supplier is an integral part of the
overall marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of defective products. Vandermark,
61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. In categorizing the manufacturer of
a custom made, built-in-place skip bridge used for trolley movement of materials in a steel
mill, a district court held under Pennsylvania law that "[lit is sufficient that (the manufac-
turer) had carried on an established and well recognized kind of business which has been a
regularly maintained activity on his part" Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 F.
Supp. 306, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
111. Participation in the chain of distribution is determinative. A laundromat operator
is a licensor of public use of his machines and is not a seller in the usual sense. Nonetheless,
a California court of appeal held that a laundromat operator was subject to strict liability as
the supplier of a defective washer that injured a patron because he played "more than a
random and accidental role in the overall marketing enterprise" of the product." Garcia v.
Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 326, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (Ct. App. 1970). Bailors and lessors
are "sellers" for strict liability purposes. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722,
85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Air Lines, 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
1970); Capital Assocs. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that UCC
implied warranties attend a lease of goods); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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users of their products than do those who mass produce products
for sales o individuals. Use by the masses and sales to the masses
carry the same risk of injury from defects.' e In Hartman v. Ope-
lika Machine and Welding Co.,11s Chief Judge Ervin, writing for
the First District Court of Appeal, rejected a stream of commerce
"defense" by a custom builder who produced a "spin buggy" used
to collect yarn produced in a textile plant. The purchaser designed
the device and the purchaser's employees used it. Over the seller's
contention that custom building to a puchaser's design meant he
was not engaged in the "business of selling such a product," the
court held that the product was indeed put into the stream of
commerce.
1 4
The appellate court properly rejected Chadbourne's assertion
that the paving mix was not put into the stream of commerce." 6
Chadbourne was regularly engaged in the business of selling paving
mix that he manufactured. That the pavement was not resold to
the ultimate user does not make the sale to the DOT disappear.
The paving mix was put into the stream of commerce.
C. Causation
Proof of cause in fact or actual cause in a strict product liabil-
ity action is fact-intensive and requires linking the defect to the
proper defendant. Fundamentally, for a court to hold a manufac-
turer liable, the defect must have existed in the product when the
manufacturer passed it on."' Further, West stated as dictum that
"ordinary rules of causation" would apply to strict product liability
112. Some courts of other jurisdictions interpret the question narrowly and hold that
products which are custom built, or used but not bought by their users, have not been put
into the stream. See supra note 49. A court may regard the transaction as primarily a ser-
vice with an incidental transmission of a product. Fisher v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 109 Cal.
App. 3d 131, 167 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1980). There is no basis for such a construction of,
or inference from, Section 402A, which, by its own terms, applies to "any product" where
the seller "is engaged in the business of selling such a product." RESTATEPiaNT (SzcoND) §
402A(1)(a). The "occasional seller" is the opposite of the seller contemplated by Section
402A. He is one who does not regularly engage in such an activity, like the neighbor who
sells you his car. This is the seller who does not put products into the stream of commerce
and, consequently, is not subject to strict liability under Section 402A. RmzsATzEmzrN (Sac-
OND) Section 402A comment f.
113. 414 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. ist DCA 1982).
114. Id. at 1106. For a suggestion that the stream of commerce concept should have a
life of its own as a second level test after determining that the injury-causing thing was a
product, see Comment, Strict Products Liability for Injuries Prior to Sale or Delivery: A
Proposed "Stream of Commerce" Test, 17 DuQ. L. Rzv. 799 (1978).
115. Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 515.
116. Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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actions.' These ordinary rules include the proximate cause rules
of negligence. 118 Determinations of cause in fact and proximate
cause are questions of fact for the jury.'1 ' Florida has a modern
proximate cause standard based on foreseeability of manner and
result120 The standard jury instruction on intervening cause
states:
Negligence may ... be a legal cause of ... injury ... even
though it operates in combination with ... some other cause
occurring after the negligence occurs if such other cause was rea-
sonably foreseeable and the negligence contributes substantially
to producing such .. .injury ... or the resulting ... injury
... was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence
and the negligence contributes substantially to producing it."'
Thus, an unforeseeable intervening act may be a superseding,
hence sole, proximate cause of an injury that was also caused in
117. West, 336 So. 2d at90.
118. Section 402A does not recommend or address the applicability of rules of proxi-
mate cause. Compensation policy and the interest in protecting the ultimate user from harm
suggest that cause in fact should be enough. See supra notes 33-39, 81 and accompanying
text. But courts need a way t limit the scope of the risk, to keep the tort from getting out
of hand. Proximate cause, the traditional escape route in negligence law, may be used (and
misused) by courts trying to tunnel their way out of strict product liability actions. See, e.g.,
Watson v. Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding
worker's misuse of product "sole proximate cause" of his injury from defective fruit sam-
pling machine on seller's motion for summary judgment, avoiding the jury's apportionment
of fault and determination whether the misuse was unforeseeable). As a policy matter,
wha#ever insurance "crisis" exists or existed in the 1970's is arguably balanced by appending
a proximate cause rule to strict product liability. See supra note 39.
119. RPrsTATrza (ScOND) I 402A comment q. See Fenner v. General Motors Corp.,
657 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1981); Ford v. International Harvester Co., 430 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983); Casaial v. Maytag Co., 96 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Martinez v. Clark
Equip. Co., 382 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
120. Florida's rules of intervening causation apply foreseeability tests to determine if a
cause in fact that follows the creation of the original risk is a superseding, hence sole, proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Sei, e.g., Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla.
1980) (The intoxicated drivei of a rental car stopped in front of the plaintiff, whose car,
when he stopped, was rear-ended by a third driver. The court held that a jury might find
the intoxicated driver liable if the intervening cause was a reasonably foreseeable result of
his negligent act.); Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977) (A driver who
left his keys in the ignition was held subject to liability for injuries caused by a thief who
stole the car and negligently operated it.); Padgett v. West Fla. Coop., Inc., 417 So. 2d 764
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (If the harm that occurred is within the scope of the risk created by the
original negligence, the intervening cause is not unforeseeable.). The actor is not shielded
from liability by an unforeseeable result or the manner in which it occurs, if his negligence
is a substantial factor in bringing about (a cause in fact of) the harm. RuSTATEMENT (Szc-
oND) § 435(1). If, by hindsight, the harm seems a highly extraordinary result of the negligent
conduct, the conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of the harm. Id. at § 435(2).
121. FLA. STD. Juav INSTM. CIv. J 5.1(c) (1974).
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fact by a defective product. If both a defect and an intervening
negligent act are proximate causes of the injury, Florida's pure
comparative fault and contribution rules allow for an apportion-
ment among tortfeasors of damages for which they are jointly and
severally liable. "2' Similarly, a downstream member of the distribu-
tive chain who did not create the defect mai sue for indemnifica-
tion for a prior settlement.123
The proof requirement of cause in fact in a strict product lia-
bility action is indeed strict. The defect must have been present in
the product when the supplier passed it on in addition to the time
when it caused injury. 124 If the product simply wore out 2" or was
negligently maintained, 2 6 it was not defective when the supplier
passed it on and causation questions do not arise.
If a jury was to find that a defect in Chadbourne's paving mix
was a cause in fact of the Vaughns' injuries, it would then decide if
the intervening acts or omissions of Walton County's agents were
reasonably foreseeable. This process would determine whether the
scope of the risk created by the defect included the county's possi-
bly negligent failure to correct the problem. The patency of the
drop-off would be an important factor, and, on the facts presented,
reasonable jurors could find that Chadbourne's defect, the county's
122. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(2)(a), 768.28(2)(b), 768.28(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985)
(When tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, their relative degrees of fault determine
their pro rats shares of damages. If one pays more than his pro rata share, he has a right of
contribution from the others.); Persaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516,
1526 (11th Cir. 1985) (Applying Florida law, the jury's stated percentages of fault of each
defendant were the proper basis for determining the applicable amount of contribution.).
123. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
124. See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
125. A strict liability action was brought against the manufacturer of a lawn mowing
tractor based on a nonskid painted surface that had worn off the platform when the user
slipped upon dismounting the tractor. The court held that the lack of a nonskid surface was
not an "unexpected danger," to which West was addressed, because the purchaser had no-
tice when the tractor was purchased that the surface would eventually wear out. Savage v.
Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 396 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Chief Judge Ervin stated in Cassisi
that a product's age, its expected useful life, its state of repair, the severity of its use, and
whether it was abnormally used are factors for the jury to weigh in determining if the prod-
uct was defective when it was in the supplier's control. Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1152. A prod-
uct may be "so old, so frequently repaired, and subjected to such rugged use" that its condi-
tion may justify a court finding that it was not defective as a matter of law. Id. See Mitchell
v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1976) (A dump truck's parking brake had not been
properly maintained by periodic adjustments for wear in 25,000 miles use. It failed to hold
the truck, which rolled over the driver, after he put on the brake and got out.); Barich v.
Ottenstror, 550 P.2d 395 (Mont. 1976) (user fell backward when handle pulled out of card-
board wardrobe moving-box used after two years' storage in unheated garage).
126. Algie Vaughn, for instance, could bring an action for negligent maintenance
against Walton County.
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inaction, both, or neither, were proximate causes of the Vaughns'
crash.
The necessity for what is often highly technical proof that the
defect in question was the cause in fact of injury combined with a
proximate cause requirement, a policy tradeoff already made,1 2 7
makes the proximate cause fiction of Slavin v. Kay s2 patently in-
apposite to the instant case.
D. The Slavin Doctrine
Developed in a negligence action by a motel guest against the
motel owner and a contractor, Slavin is Florida's version of the.
accepted-work doctrine. The guest was injured when a sink in his
room came loose from the wall and fell on him. The supreme court
held that a dangerous condition that caused a third party's injury,
and was negligently created by a building contractor, is the proxi-
mate cause of the injury if the defect was not discoverable by the
owner upon a reasonable inspection. The owner, however, has sole
responsibility for patknt defects after he accepts the work.'" The
contractor is subject th ongoing liability for hidden (latent) defects.
Discovery of latent defects is not reasonably expected of the owner,
while the contractor is "treated like any other tortfeasor" who cre-
ates dangers of which he should have known.'"e
What the Slavin court really did was carve out a piece of the
privity rule, as did other courts in other areas of negligence law, by
applying the latent danger exception to a dangerous condition on
land. The injured visitor was thus able to hold liable the building
contractor who created a latent risk, with whom he was not in
privity.
Although it might be indexed as a rule of intervening causa-
tion in the loosest sense, Slavin is really a privity rule disguised as
a proximate cause fiction that works like an on-off switch.' 1 It can
select one defendant for liability and insulate another in a multi-
party construction negligence action."'s The Slavin court used
127. See supra note 118.
128 108 So. 2d 462 (FIl. 1958).
129. Id. at 468.
130. Id. at 467.
131. An example of Slauin's authentic legal gibberish is the passage wherein the court
states that if "the owner cannot be held to have assumed the risk of a particular defect or
danger, then there is no intervening fault to sever the causal relation." Id. (emphasis
added).
132. When the defect is patent, the action may be viewed as one against the owner for
negligent maintenance in not discovering and correcting the defect. See id. at 466 (citing
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proximate cause as a vehicle for expanding the scope of the con-
tractor's duty. Almost thirty years later, however, its patent danger
limitation is inconsistent with Florida's approaches to both fault
and proximate cause. The courts have repeatedly questioned the
correctness of the rule in the last decade, in view of Florida's move
to pure comparative fault and contribution,' 188 which represents a
judicial policy of striving to "equate liability with fault in negli-
gence actions' ' 84 and a rejection of common law fictions of "proxi-
mate fault."1' 6
E. What is Slavin Doing Here?
At first blush, Slavin and its proximate cause fiction seem
wholly out of place in a strict product liability action. Nonetheless,
the First District Court of Appeal assumed that because the road
drop-off was patent and observable (and had in fact been observed
by an employee of Walton County), Chadbourne, as the paver of
the road, would not be liable were he not also the manufacturer of
the paving mix.1 6
The trial court did not make clear the basis upon which it
granted Chadbourne's motion for summary judgment. Under Sla-
vin, however, the patency of the defect would ordinarily preclude
holding Chadbourne liable for creating it. The appellate court had
to distinguish Slavin before it could reach the definitional issue
under Section 402A and reverse on Vaughn's strict liability
claim. 37
The First District found an issue that previous courts may
have ignored. Emphasizing that Chadbourne was a manufacturer
as well as a contractor, and that the Slavin rule applies only to
contractors, the court was able to decide that Chadbourne was sub-
Casey v. Wrought Iron Bridge Co., 114 Mo. App. 74, 89 S.W. 330 (1905)). The Slavin court
did not care if this theory, or that of imputing the contractor's fault to the owner, was the
theoretical basis for its rule. Id.
133. See Hoffman v. Jones, 287 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); supra note 122.
134. Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978). See El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). But see Lubell v.
Roman Spa, Inc., 362 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1978).
135. See Vinson, Proximate Cause Should Be Barred From Wandering Outside Negli-
gence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 215, 252-53 (1985).
136. Vaughn v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 462 So. 2d 512, 514-15 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985).
137. Id. at 514. The trial court and the court of appeal both assumed that Slavin ap-
plied to a strict product liability action. The only way the trial judge could have granted
Chadbourne's motion for summary judgment on all three theories (negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability) was to rely on the Slavin argument.
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ject to strict product liability for defects in its paving mix. The
First Distict used this narrow, novel reading of Slavin to limit it,
sidestep it, and avoid either applying it or questioning its underly-
ing validity.'"
F. Slavin Is Misapplied to a Product Liability Action
Strict product liability actions are founded upon the policy of
holding sellers liable for injury-causing defects in their products.
The manufacturer of a defective product is the ultimate defendant.
Whether its defective, product was a proximate cause of the injury
is a factual question that the jury answers by assessing the scope of
the risk created by the defect. It is not very likely that the West
court had Slavin's proximate cause fiction in mind when it spoke
of "ordinary rules of causation," and even if it did, the ordinary
rules of causation are not frozen in time.
However patent the drop-off might have been to the county
commissioner who inspected the eroding pavement in the daylight,
it was far from patent to the Vaughns as they drove over it in the
dark.18' The recent case of Pando v. Lloyd Citrus Trucking, Inc.0'O
well illustrates how a iefect that is patent to the DOT upon a day-
time inspection becomes a nighttime trap for motorists.
In Pando, a state road had an unmarked turn lane at an inter-
section, and a trucker, keeping to the right as he crossed the inter-
section, dropped down to the shoulder when his lane disappeared.
In a resultant negligence action, the jury rejected the argument
that the defect was patent and that the DOT should be solely re-
sponsible for the dangerous intersection. The danger encountered
138. Chief Judge Ervin's manufacturer/contractor distinction would cause problems in
later cases. Contractors (assemblers of the larger product and sellers of supplies) and owners
(suppliers of the larger product) could argue that Slavin insulates them from strict liability
because they are not manufacturers. See Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 515. This would restrict the,
injured party's access to members of the chain of distribution, undercutting strict liability
policies. Judge Ervin offered no reason why a manufacturer/seller should be subject to strict
liability, but a mere seller should not be. A good reason would not be easy to find.
139. Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 513.
140. 83-7085 CA(L) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 25, 1985), summarized in 28 ATLA L Rsw.
360 (1985). Pando involved a section of southbound State Road 7 in West Palm Beach,
where a tractor-trailer driver, keeping to the right as he went through an intersection, found
that he had run out of road and hit a four inch drop-off to the shoulder. He was in an
unmarked turn lane which had, until then, been an unmarked through-lane. The driver
steered left to climb back up to the road. When the tires regained the pavement, the truck
shot across the road and smashed head on into a compact car in the northbound lane. Some
occupants of the car and the survivors of the others sued the truck driver's employer, who
counterclaimed against the developer who designed and built the intersection. Id.
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was the invisibility of the drop-off in the dark.'M  The factual ques-
tion raised goes to the heart of both the Vaughn case and the Sla-
vin doctrine: whether the risk posed by the patent defect discov-
ered by the owner is the same risk as the one posed by the latent
defect that caused the harm. This question should have prevented
the trial court from granting Chadbourne's motion for summary
judgment in the first place."1
The undesirable consequences of applying the Slavin doctrine
to strict product liability actions begin with the instant case. Here,
the fortuity of a manufacturer's installing a defective product him-
self and the defect becoming obvious would absolve him of liabil-
ity. Such a result would subvert the strict product liability cause of
action, which is designed to protect the ultimate user from injury-
causing defects by assigning the loss to those who create the
risks.14 3
The First District examined the "patent danger" rule for guid-
ance in dealing with Slavin and the effect of patent defects in a
strict product liability action. In Auburn Machine Works v.
Jones," the Supreme Court of Florida had previously rejected the
argument that an open and obvious hazard in the product absolves
the manufacturer of responsibility for the user's injury. The Au-
burn court recognized that "the patent danger doctrine encourages
manufacturers to be outrageous in their design, to eliminate safety
devices and to make hazards obvious. ' " 5 The rule suffered from
rigidity and produced harsh results because it prevented the plain-
tiff from establishing his case altogether. The better view is to
make the obviousness of the danger available to the defendant on
141. Id., summarized in ATLA L. REP., supra note 140, at 361.
142. Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 514-15. Even if the "uncontroverted evidence" reveals that
the defect was patent and observable to agents of Walton County upoen a daytime inspec-
tion, a material factual question has not been negated, that is, whether the invisible danger
encountered by the Vaughns on the night of the crash was a danger different from the one
posed by the defect observed. If reasonable jurors could differ, Chadbourne did not carry his
burden. The movant must negate all material questions of fact to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment in Florida. Holl v. Talcott, 171 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), con-
formed to, 192 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), appeal after remand, 224 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1969).
143. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
144. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979). See Watson v. Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So.
2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Compare id. with Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d
802 (1950) (holding the duty owed to users is merely to make an inherently dangerous ma-
chine free from latent defects). This theory, a variant of the volenti non fit injuria approach
to assumption of risk, was overruled in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d
571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
145. Auburn, 366 So. 2d at 1170.
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the issues of whether the defect is unreasonably dangerous and
whether the plaintiff acted reasonably in the circumstances." This
approach advances Florida's policy of correlating liability with
fault.147
Auburn expressly rejected the existence of a patent danger as
a bar to the plaintiff's recovery in a strict product liability action
and subsumed it in the assessment of the plaintiff's comparative
fault. 1 4  West had previously stated that a plaintiff's failure to dis-
cover a defect was not a defense to a strict liability action. e14 The
inescapable conclusion is that a manufacturer remains subject to
liability when a defect is patent to a third party, if the victim's
own discovery of the defect would not bar his recovery.'"
Policy has aimed the strict product liability action at the man-
ufacturer by definition. By the terms of West and its progeny, pa-
tency is not determinative, but merely a factot relevant to the is-
sues of defectiveness- and comparative fault. Who created the
defect, and whether 4 intervening act was outside its scope, are
factors relevant to theissues of cause in fact and proximate cause.
These are questions for the trier of fact. They are to be answered
separately. As a negligence rule, Slavin is obsolete. To apply it now
to a strict product liability action is mischief.
146. Id. at 1169.
147. Id. at 1171 (citing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 1973)).
148. Auburn, 366 So. 2d at 1167, 1169.
149. West, 336 So. 2d at 90. See Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (holding
implied assumption of risk is no bar to recovery and the reasonableness of plaintiff's con-
duct is considered under comparative negligence principles).
150, See Amicus Curiae Brief of Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (for respondent
Vaughn) at 15-16 Chadbourne v. Vaughn, No. 66,413 (Fla. Oct. 11, 1985). In the appellate
court, Chief Judge Ervin relied upon Auburn on the issue of patency of defect. Vaughn, 462
So. 2d at 515. His own opinion in Hardin is also instructive. Hardin v. Montgomery Elevator
Co., 435 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). There, an elevator manufacturer argued that his
knowledge when he passed on his product that it was to be inspected for defects put him
beyond the reach of strict product liability. The court held that this knowledge was merely a
factor for the jury to consider on the question whether the product was defective when It
was in the manufacturer's hands. Id. at 336-37. See supra note 125. Like the actual age of
the product, its expected sales life, the severity of its use, and the state of its repair, the
facts relating to its inspection are part of the history of the product. If the manufacturer is
not immunized by knowledge that inspection is a part of the useful life of its product, it
cannot be immunized by the facts surrounding actual inspection. Roads, like elevators, are
regularly inspected. Roads require maintenance, and may frequently require early repaving
when paving mixes are not defective. In possession of all the relevant evidence, a jury might
decide that Chadbourne's paving mix was not defective when it was made, despite the pa-
tency of the drop-off that appeared later. Mere patency proves too much (and the wrong
element) if Slavin is applied.
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G. Slavin Must Go
The accepted-work doctrine of Slavin mucks up the works of
Florida's negligence law. Perhaps it was useful as a privity excep-
tion, but subsequent case law has evolved well past this point.1 1
The trial court relied on Slavin to grant Chadbourne summary
judgment on all three theories, and the First District had to get
around Slavin to reverse. 152 The supreme court now must face the
rule, and it can do Florida tort law a favor by overruling Slavin
outright instead of affirming Judge Ervin's unrealistic manufac-
turer/contractor distinction. 53
The supreme court might take its cue, as did the Auburn
court, from Micallef v. Miehle,"' which overruled the patent dan-
ger rule in New York. Following Micallef, the New York courts
recognized that the same principles compelled rejecting their ver-
sion of the Slavin patent/latent test. In Cubito v. Kriegsberg,1"
the court stated:
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care
in his plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of
harm to anyone who is likely to be exposed to the danger ... in
considering the extent of the liability of an architect, by parity
of reasoning the liability of an architect must now be treated
under the same tests currently applied toward an industrial
manufacturer. That is to say, the test of patent or latent defect
is not to be applied, and the question of liability depends rather
on whether the architect exercised due care in preparing his
plans. ' "
The question, as it was in Slavin, is whether the contractor or de-
signer should not be treated like any other tortfeasor. 57 What was
the exception is now the rule. A foreseeable plaintiff has a cause of
151. The availability of negligence actions against building contractors, engineers, and
architects by those out of privity is well settled. Winning such actions is another matter. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
152. It is not at all clear that Chadbourne was entitled to summary judgment even if
the supreme court neither overrules Slavin nor holds it inapplicable to a strict product lia-
bility action. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 138.
154. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
155. 69 A.D.2d 738, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1979).
156. Id. at 744-45, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (emphasis added). The Illinois supreme court
discarded the accepted-work in Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Il. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). See
Fournier v. 3113 W. Jefferson Partnership, 100 Ill. App. 3d 820, 427 N.E.2d 408 (App. Ct.
1981).
157. Slavin, 108 So.2d at 467.
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action against a negligent contractor in Florida. 5 8 The privity rule,
which was the reason for the Slavin exception, no longer exists.
In a multiparty action, where the owner and the contractor are
defendants, the owner is likely to be held partly at fault for negli-
gent maintenance anyway, even where the contractor is liable for a
latent construction defect. A good illustration is Echols v. Ham-
mett Co.,6'9 where the jury found the DOT and the contractor
6.7% and 8.3% at fault, respectively, on that basis.' The DOT
and the road builder could not both have been liable unless the
jury found that each one's negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury. This approach drains the content from the Slavin rule,
which purports to insulate the owner when a defect is latent.
It is a bastard rule of "proximate fault," fundamentally un-
sound, and subversive to a pure comparative fault and contribu-
tion scheme. This is an appropriate time for the supreme court to
throw the baggage overboard.
H. Policy Reasons and Results
Each year our nation's losses on the highways equal our losses.
in Vietnam. No small portion of these losses is the result of dan-
gerous roads."" Ultimate users need protection from equipment
failure, costing lives, caused by defects in manufacture. Modern
roads are part of the driver's equipment. The county road capable
of handling modern vehicles in modern numbers is no pathway dug
out of dirt. Its design and construction are highly technical.'.' It
has the qualities of a product, and the carnage it engenders if it is
defective invokes strict liability's basic policies of compensation,
protection, and safety.
The argument that the risk of injury-causing defects could be
spread, through insurance and a pass-along of settlement costs,
originally helped persuade courts to adopt strict product liability.
Of late, it is a flipped argument, used to justify checking the
growth of the doctrine where risk spreading may be undesirable.
158. See supra notes 74-75.
159. 423 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
160. The trial judge directed a verdict for the road builder, a residential developer,
applying Slavin incorrectly, where the evidence raised a question of fact as to latency of the
defect. Echols, 423 So. 2d at 925. The Fourth Dictrict Court of Appeal stated that it would
have reinstated the jury verdict were it not for the trial judge's refusal to allow the builder's
final argument that the DOT's negligent maintenance was the sole cause of the accident
that occurred when a car left the roadway and encountered a drop-off to the shoulder. Id.




Highway construction is costly, it is not unlike medical care insofar
as highways are essential products,1 " and this is one situation
where potential plaintiffs spread the risk by self-insurance.
In their bids on public projects, pavers required to increase
their insurance coverage will attempt to pass on these and other
settlement costs that may result from strict liability. The state
might raise license and registration fees or reinstate an auto in-
spection program to pass along the costs to the public. If such ef-
forts turn out to be insufficient, and if the paver must pay higher
settlement costs at a fixed fee level for his highway work because
he is subject to strict liability, then it must be remembered that
paving contractors pave commercial projects, too.
The shopping mall parking lot is not a public work, it is fueled
by private commerce, and the mall is the focal point of the con-
sumer's contact with the "overall marketing enterprise." Higher
settlement costs for highway construction that a contractor cannot
directly pass on can be balanced or defrayed by commercial work,
where the contractor can make such pass-alongs.
If this is how the cost is to be spread among motorists, so be
it. The paver's public trust when he paves a public road cannot be
diminished. This pavement must work safely in all weather condi-
tions under cars travelling at three times the speed of cars in the
driveways and parking lots that the paver paves in the private
sector.
Notwithstanding the pass-along question, knock out Slavin
and let in the strict liability action and roads will be built better.
Although the cost of road construction and lack of public funds are
part of the problem of defective roads, the state is not helped in
any way by defective dedicated roads such as those in Echols or
Pando, or defective county roads, as in Vaughn. It is likely to be a
defendant when shoddy design and workmanship cause accidents
that result in lawsuits. As Echols shows, the state cannot easily
shift all the loss from latent defects anyway,' which is the only
possible benefit to it of the Slavin rule in a defective highway case.
The Echols court did not question the jury's ability to find that
the owner's negligent maintenance and the contractor's latent de-
fect were both proximate causes of the injury. This indicates that
Slavin is already overruled in practice, if not in principle.
A narrow reading of the cases is the path to Judge Ervin's re-
163. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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suit.'"5 It is good jurisprudence for the supreme court to read Sla-
vin narrowly if it does not have the consensus to reverse it, and to
use the building supply cases to affirm that strict liability is appro-
priate, because the question whether the road is itself a product is
not before it. Courts that purport to use pure policy reasons for
justifying application: or withholding application of strict liability
seldom do so consistently,'" and importing inconsistency into the
law is not good jurisprudence. Finally, as the Schipper court
stated, "[aincient dictinctions which make no sense in today's soci-
ety and tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected.""'
IV. CONCLUSION
The First District Court of Appeal properly applied Florida
case law and the policies that undergird the doctrine of strict prod-
uct liability to the paving mix and its manufacturer. The Florida
building supply cases'" require affirming the First District, which
did not hold that improvements are products under Section 402A,
merely that product incorporated into improvements remain
products. This does no violence to Florida law.'"9 Neither does a
decision that the paving mix was put into the stream of
commerce. 1
o
The First District read the Slavin doctrine narrowly and prop-
erly distinguished it. The manufacturer of a defective product is
not immunized because someone will inspect it, and remains sub-
ject to strict liability irrespective of how obvious is the defect and
to whom. 71 Applying Stavin would let in the back door a rule that
166. Except for his distinction between manufacturers and sellers with respect to strict
liability. But this distinction 'is not necessary to his result. See supra note 82.
166. See aupra note 53.
167. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 90, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
168. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
169. Because the courts do not reach the question whether improvements are "larger"
products, neither the state, asthe designer and supplier of roads, nor designers and develop-
ers of other improvements to real property are subject to a strict liability action for defects
which cause injury to the person or property. See supra note 106; Fisher v. Morrison
Homes, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 3d 131, 167 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1980); Milam v. Midland
Corp., 282 Ark. 16, 665 S.W.2d 284 (1984).
170. Hartman v. Opelika Mach. & Welding Co., 414 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
171. Auburn Mach. Works v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 331 (Fl 1979). Despite the supreme
court's reaffirmance of Slavin seven years ago in Lubell, the question of its validity will not
go away. Lubell v. Roman Spa, Inc., 362 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1978). Stavin persists as an anom-
aly which perverts the jury's fact-finding role in a pure comparative fault scheme. Fault and
causation are separate inquiries. They should not and need not be bootstrapped and con-
fused. Proximate cause fictions such as Stavin, last clear chance, or the patent danger doc-
trine are really breach of duty or fault questions, anyway. Slavin further confuses the mat-
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has been barred at the gate.
Proof of cause in fact requires that the plaintiff link the manu-
facturer to the injury by a defect for which the manufacturer is
responsible, that is, a defect that inhered in the product when he
passed it on. This is no small burden of proof, and it is made more
because the plaintiff also must prove that the defect proximately
caused his injury. An obvious defect under Slavin may prevent the
plaintiff from presenting his case at all. Giving this advantage to
the manufacturer is not justifiable in view of the injured plaintiff's
heavy burden of causal proof. 72 Neither is it justifiable that a
manufacturer has a patent danger defense when his defective prod-
ucts are incorporated into improvements, but not when they are
incorporated into movable goods.
Florida's implied warranty remedy to first purchasers of resi-
dences does some jobs that strict liability does elsewhere, notably
California. The extension of a strict liability remedy will eventually
subsume Florida's new privity rule, and fill in its patchwork of im-
plied warranty law for improvements. 7 The same evolution from
sales warranty to strict liability that took place with chattels will
take place with improvements. With time, the consumer becomes
ever more vulnerable and exposed, while his ability to prove negli-
gence against remote defendants becomes ever less. Meanwhile, the
supply of improvements takes on the character of an "overall mar-
keting enterprise." It is pure foolishness that victims of defective
products in the home have no strict liability remedy, but their
neighbors who live on a boat or travel in a motor home do.
There may be problems with the required result. Courts have
not satisfactorily addressed the big product/little product question.
Why is the paving mix a product but not the road it becomes? 74
ter by assigning duty, breach, and causation as a matter of law by way of the patency of the
defect. The rule should be replaced with the well developed principles of comparative fault
and intervening causation based on foreseeability before it can foul up and confound those
trying to fathom and apply Florida product liability law. Note that the First District hold-
ing makes Slavin applicable to a strict liability action that does not involve a manufacturer.
If the contractor/assembler and owner/seller analogies are to be recognized they will be born
into strict liability with prenatal injuries caused by Stavin.
172. If Slavin does control all theories in this case, the manufacturer/contractor could
concede that he was negligent in creating a patent defect. Because the patency of the defect
shifts responsibility to the owner for the injuries caused by the defect, Chadbourne, as a
contractor, has a defense of negligence to a strict liability action against him as a
manufacturer.
173. This is so bad? See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text
174. Similarly, the elevator is a product, but the building may not be, in Hardin v.
Montgomery Elevator Co., 435 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); the roof tiles or trusses are
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Likewise, it seems unfair to hold a materialman or manufacturer of
building supplies subject to strict liability for defects without cast-
ing a similar responsibility upon the seller or supplier of the im-
provement, the larger product, for defective manufacture or defec-
tive design. 1'5
Finally, road maintenance and construction are costly. The na-
tion's roads include many miles needing immediate attention,
while public funds for this purpose are already in short supply; this
is part of the probleni. 176 The natural impulse is to fear a rash of
strict liability suits for defective pavement following affirmance of
the First District in Vaughn. States, however, are well protected
by immunities and the designer doctrine." 7 As for private party
defendants such as Chadbourne, it must be remembered that this
case is unusual. The road deteriorated in two years." 8 Most of the
documented dangerous roads have not been properly maintained
since they were paved and/or built many years ago. Consequently,
statutes of repose will moderate the volume of actions brought,
and the simple defense of the pavement having worn out will be
effective in the greater number of cases."'
Ultimately, the strong public policy of protecting the public'
from unexpected dangers in products of all sorts must link up with
a no less strong public policy favoring highway safety to insure
that Algie Vaughn and others similarly situated have the remedy
guaranteed to them by the Florida Constitution. ' " The motorist
needs adequate protection against unexpected dangers resulting
products but perhaps not the rooves in Gory Assoc. Indus. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet
Metal, 358 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) & Tri-County Truss v. Leonard, 467 So. 2d 370
(Fla. 4th DCA 1985). What test will work if not all improvements are products under Sec-
tion 402A? The separate identity test of the Illinois courts? Will they apply it consistently?
See Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142 (App. Ct.
1983).
175. Developers may have deeper pockets and may be more insurable than paving con-
tractors. They probably are in a better position than contractors to pass along settlement
costs.
176. See supra note 107.
177. 'See supra note 106.
178. Vaughn, 462 So. 2d at 51&
179. See supra note 125. In many states, and probably now in Florida, statutes of re-
pose allow an action to be time-barred before it accrues, whether it is based on building
defects or product defects. The running of repose periods will limit the ability of injured
parties to bring strict liability actions for design/construction/material defects as opposed to
actions for negligent maintenance. See supra note 95.
180. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, £ 21. If the supreme court adopts the trial court's view of this
case, Vaughn has no remedy under any theory of recovery against Chadbourne.
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from defective equipment. Sooner or later, courts will recognize
that the motorist's equipment includes county road 1087.
ALAN H. ROLNICK*
*For my wife, Mahli, and our family. Thanks to the three o'clock club, and credit to the
team. All who touched this piece left it better than they found it.
1985]
